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Abstract
Zimbabwean villagers of distinct background have resettled in government organized land
reforms for more than three decades. Against this backdrop, I assess the level of social
cohesion in some of the newly established communities by estimating average preferences
for fairness in a structural model of bounded rationality. The estimations are based on
behavioral data from an ultimatum game field experiment played by 234 randomly selected
households in six traditional and 14 resettled villages almost two decades after resettlement.
In two out of three distinct resettlement schemes studied, the resettled villagers exhibit
significantly higher degrees of fairness (p ≤ 0.11) and rationality (p ≤ 0.04) than those who
live in traditional villages. Overall, villagers are similarly rational (p = 0.30) but the attitude
toward fairness is significantly stronger in resettled communities (p ≤ 0.01). These findings
are consistent with the idea of a raised need for cooperation required in recommencement.
Keywords: Africa, behavioral economics, inequality aversion, land reform, impact evaluation,
social change, social development, social preferences, structural estimation, quantal response
model
JEL classifications: C11, C72, C91, C93, D03, O12, O13, O18, Q15, Z13
1 Introduction
Since gaining independence in 1980, the government of Zimbabwe has implemented land re-
form schemes to address inequalities in land ownership. In consequence, numerous Zimbab-
wean households have resettled in government organized land reform programs in the past,
and resettlement continues to affect the life of people. The government’s land policy can be
divided into two periods:
A controversial fast-track land redistribution began by president Mugabe in 2000. This land
reform has been criticized for its socioeconomic consequences: "Mr. Mugabe’s chaotic land
redistribution campaign [...] caused an exodus of white farmers, crippled the economy, and
ushered in widespread shortages of basic commodities" (Voice of America 2009). Yet, it is also
argued that ten years after large areas of Zimbabwe’s commercial farm land were compulsorily
transferred without compensation, a new rural economy has developed: "A wide range of
activities contribute to highly differentiated livelihoods in [some of] the new resettlements"
(Scoones et al. 2010). In February 2009, president Mugabe accepted to share power, but declared
to continue the fast-track land redistribution.
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Before the fast-track land reform, a willing-buyer and willing-seller land reform program ex-
isted for two decades, in which donors assisted the Zimbabwean government to finance the
purchase of land. Until 1997 this scheme resettled over 70,000 indigenous households on farms
previously owned by white commercial farmers. The scheme targeted individual households
of displaced people, the landless and those with insufficient land to sustain themselves and
their families. The beneficiaries were allocated 5 hectares of arable land for cultivation in a re-
settlement site and remaining area was devoted to communal grazing land. Households were
also allocated a residential plot within newly planned villages. As the majority of households
resettled on an individual basis, resettled villagers, unlike traditional villagers, started to live
largely amongst unrelated households instead of their kin (Barr 2004a; Dekker 2004a; Owens
et al. 2003).
Given the challenge to restart along with unfamiliar people that resettled people face, the
Zimbabwean land reform poses the question whether villagers in new communities lost social
capital and in the long run suffer from the eradication of social ties brought about by resettle-
ment, or if they can achieve their development anew: Does social cohesion emerge amongst
former strangers after resettlement, in some instances, and if so, how much? To address this
question, I study if different social preferences are present in some of the communities of the
early Zimbabwean land reform period and their non-resettled counterparts almost two decades
after once unfamiliar households became neighbors through resettling.1 I measure social cohe-
sion roughly by estimating the relative strengths of self-interest in relation to interest in fairness,
defined as an aversion toward inequality between own and other’s well-being. Since social co-
hesion supports cooperation, it can be conducive to the chances of reestablishing functioning
communities.
I explore the levels of social cohesion in three resettlement schemes (Mupfurudzi, Mutanda,
Sengezi) and geographically close by traditional communities. Data stem from an ultimatum
game field experiment preceding this study (Barr 2004b) and were also part of a large scale
study of cross-cultural variation in behavior (Henrich et al. 2001, 2005). The given ultimatum
game choice problem was to be solved anonymously by randomly matched pairs of villagers
within 14 resettled and six traditional communities. The decision task in the ultimatum game
experiment mimics the common aspect of bargaining situations that two parties have to reach
an agreement to realize a mutually beneficial outcome. Novel is the approach of applying a
structural decision model to this field experimental data in order to disentangle self-interested,
fairness and rationality as competing explanations for the variations in experimental behav-
ior that were observed across regions and resettlement status. The structural model correctly
specified allows to extrapolate the parameters estimated in these villages to other settings than
the experiment. A quantal response equilibrium is applied to estimate the relative strength
of fairness in relation to self-interested. It is a game theoretic solution concept, which com-
bines an equilibrium notion that accounts for strategic optimizing behavior with bounded ra-
tionality (McKelvey & Palfrey 1995; Mckelvey & Palfrey 1998). Players are assumed to make
random errors in choosing which pure strategy to play, but the probability of any particu-
lar strategy being chosen increases in its payoff such that more costly errors are less likely.
1The fast-track land reform began in 2000 seized white-owned farms. Its legality and constitutionality have been
challenged in the Zimbabwean High and Supreme Courts. The fast-track and willing-buyer-willing-seller land reform
took place in a different macroeconomic and political context with distinct resettlement practices. The robustness
of the presented results across different land reform modalities remains subject to further research.
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The introduced randomness transforms the deterministic in a stochastic model that allows for
maximum-likelihood estimation of the model’s parameters.
The estimation results indicate significant degrees of fairness and bounded rationality in
addition to self-interest for all of the three different areas studied. Overall (p ≤ 0.01), in the
Sengezi (p < 0.01) area and arguably in the Mutanda (p ≤ 0.11) area, resettled villagers show
significantly higher degrees of fairness than their traditional village counterparts. The pooled
data of all areas does not reject the hypothesis that resettled and traditional villagers are, on
average, equally rational (p = 0.30). For the Mutanda and Sengezi areas, the assumption of
common rationality is rejected (p ≤ 0.04) and significantly higher degrees of rationality are
estimated for their resettled villagers. Also in Mupfurudzi, higher degrees of fairness and
rationality are estimated for resettled villagers, but the difference from the preferences and ra-
tionality of traditional villagers is insignificant. The positive correlation between fairness and
rationality is consistent with the idea that social cohesion comes along with villagers’ expe-
rience in cooperative interaction with unrelated households that, presumably, occurred more
frequently in resettled villages.
The paper has six sections. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 describes the
ultimatum game and data. Section 4 introduces the model. Section 5 presents the model fit and
estimation results. It also discusses limitations of the analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Some scholars argue that there is diversity in the strength of social preferences, which capture
forms of (conditional) altruism in addition to self-interest, across societies and individuals.
Barr et al. (2009) investigate to what extent behavioral variations observed in three bargaining
games that were played in 15 distinct societies ranging from US undergraduates to Amazonian,
Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers could be attributed to differences along a single dimen-
sion, namely the value placed on equality. Testing a number of predictions implied by a utility
function, which captures the same notion of quadratic inequality aversion as employed in this
paper, they conclude that "inequality aversion is the principle motivating factor [in all soci-
eties] and variations in behavior across societies and across individuals within societies do, in
large part, result from differences in the value placed upon equality." Bellemare et al. (2008) use
data from ultimatum and dictator games played online by a large representative Dutch pop-
ulation sample to estimate nonlinear preferences for equity combined with limited rationality.
Heterogeneous equity preferences together with subjective expectations predict their observed
decisions well. In addition, research suggests that models of social preferences reproduce ob-
served behavior consistently when estimated in a quantal response equilibrium of different
experimental games. Bounded rationality and significant degrees of altruism reproduce be-
havior in public goods games (Anderson et al. 1998; Offerman et al. 1998); linear or quadratic
fairness and decision error predict the patterns of positive offers and rejections in as well as
across bargaining games (De Bruyn & Bolton 2008; Goeree & Holt 2000).
Other scholars argue that the combined use of randomized controlled trials and structural
models can improve the study of politics (Wantchekon & Guardado R. 2011). The study at
hand follows a similar line of research by fitting a model of quadratic fairness to data from an
ultimatum game field experiment that was played by Zimbabwean villagers, of which some ex-
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perienced a fundamental change in their environment that may have affected preferences. The
same methodology and Zimbabwean ultimatum game data were used previously. Estimating
social preferences on the study population level, Kohler (2008) finds no evidence for gender-
related differences in the Zimbabwean villagers’ preferences, a result that could be due to the
small sample size, but that resettlement status impacts the value villagers place on equality sig-
nificantly. This finding was robust in a limited test of the model specification, which suggested
that a model of symmetric inequality aversion fits the aggregate ultimatum game data bet-
ter than a model of aversion merely to disadvantageous situations. The study also compared
estimates from ultimatum games played in small-scale societies and industrialized countries,
and it argues that higher levels of decision error are estimated for small-scale societies even
when correcting for the different purchasing power of the money at stake in games. In the new
analyses of the paper at hand, I employ Kohler (2008)’s model specification with symmetric in-
equality aversion that fitted the data better to trace the observed difference in social preferences
after resettlement on the regional level.
In a complementary analysis of social consequences of the Zimbabwean land reform, Barr
(2003) studied Trust Game behavior in the same resettlement schemes. She concluded that
altruistic motivations matter less while motivations relating to a desire to community-built
matter more in resettled communities. This insight is supported by the estimated fairness at-
titudes put forward in this study because fairness concerns, a form of conditional altruism,
provide one plausible explanation for cooperativeness. More recently, field experiments were
also used in the study of social cohesion in other contexts, for instance, to address the question
as to whether brief foreign-funded efforts to build local institutions have positive effects on
social cohesion in post-conflict Liberia. In a randomized rollout of a community-driven recon-
struction program, Fearon et al. (2009) compare villagers that participated in a public goods
game. The villagers exposed to the reconstruction program exhibited higher levels of cooper-
ation than the control group, as measured by their average contributions in the public goods
game. Bellows & Miguel (2009) find that people more exposed to violence during the civil
war in Sierra Leone participate more in local collective action. Similar findings are reported in
Uganda (Blattman 2009). More war exposure predicts more sharing with neighbors in Burundi
(Voors et al. 2012) and more in-group inequality aversion in Georgia and Sierra Leone (Bauer
et al. 2012). For an overview of the range of field experiments that study the political economy
of development see, for instance, Humphreys & Weinstein (2009).
3 Data
Data were generated in 1999 observing behavior in an ultimatum game (UG) field experiment
conducted by Barr (2004b) in Zimbabwe. Her sample covers 234 households (117 matched
pairs) in 14 newly established villages, which were all among the first resettled villages created
in 1982, within three resettlement schemes and six geographically nearby traditional commu-
nities. Each resettlement scheme’s area represents one of Zimbabwe’s three agriculturally most
important agroclimatic zones that correspond to regions of moderately high, moderate and
restricted agricultural potential: Mupfurudzi in Mashonaland Central Province, Mutanda in
Manicaland Province, and Sengezi in Mashonaland East Province (Owen et al. 2003). While
the traditional villages exist since the 1940s and 1950s, the inhabitants’ ancestors lived together
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before, giving the social structure a longer tradition that differs from the resettled communities
(see, for instance, Dekker 2004a,b). Within villages, participants for the UG experiment were
recruited by inviting each household to send a member above the age of 14. The headman was
asked to oversee that between forty and sixty percent of the volunteers were women. Play in
the games was anonymous, non-recurring and for stakes between a half and two day’s local
casual labor wage. The stakes in the administered UG were Zim$ 50 and the smallest unit to
offer was Zim$ 5. Since the subject pool was small and experimentees knew they were playing
with someone from their village, observed play was seen to be likely to reflect experiences from
the day-to-day communal interaction (Barr 2004b).2
The UG itself is a strategic situation, in which two players are allotted a sum of money
(the stakes) and then bargain about its division. The first player, called proposer, makes an
offer, which the second player, the responder, can accept or reject. If the responder accepts then
the stakes are divided according to the proposed split. If the responder rejects, both receive
nothing. Subgame perfect equilibrium and own money maximization predict that proposers
should offer the smallest non-zero amount and responders should always accept because they
face a choice between zero and something. In contrast, as observed in numerous prior UG ex-
periments (see, for instance, Oosterbeek et al. 2004), the behavior within the UG experiments
in all Zimbabwean villages substantially deviated from narrow self-interest: Firstly, offers are
positive averaging 38 to 48 percent of the stakes and the unique mode for all but Mupfurudzi’s
traditional proposers is fair division. Secondly, offers below 30 percent of the stakes were re-
jected by 33 to 57 percent of responders in all but Sengezi’s traditional villages, in which still
17 percent of the responders reject such low offers (table 1, rows 1-4).
Comparing behavior of traditional and resettled villagers (table 1, rows 5-12) shows that
mean offers in villages of the three resettlement schemes are between 45 and 48 percent as
compared to 38 to 43 percent in geographically close traditional communities. While all aver-
age offers are larger in resettled villages, a two-sided t-test indicates that the difference is sig-
nificant only in the pooled and in the Sengezi sample at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
A Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test further indicates a difference in the overall offer distribution
at the 5 percent level. Chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests show no statistical evidence for dif-
ference in the overall rejection rate of the observed offers, but for differences in the average
rejection rate of low offers below 50 and 30 percent in the pooled sample as well as for the
rejection rate of offers below 30 percent in Sengezi at the 10 and 16 percent level, respectively.
An equal partition of the money at stake is proposed most frequently in 69 and 55 percent of
all play in resettled and traditional villages, respectively. The most generous offer of 60 percent
of the stakes is observed three times in two resettled villages of the Mupfurudzi area.
Due to optimizing behavior, in the form of strategic anticipation of the other’s incentives,
and the abstract experimental context, it is in question how to interpret the differences de-
tected in the descriptive statistics of the UG behavior (for the aggregate data denoted first by
Barr 2004b) and how to learn from these differences beyond the context of the game?3 In the
2The proportion of households sampled in the experiments varied between 0.31 and 0.59 or was 1. Average
earnings were between half a day’s and a day’s casual wage. The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was
Zim$ 37.95 per US$.
3Higher proposals in the ultimatum game may not only result from social cohesion or fairness considerations. In
particular, also greater uncertainty about the responder’s rejection behavior may cause self-interested precautionary
high proposals.
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remainder of the paper, I resolve both questions by linking the behavior that is observed in
the UG to underlying incentives and the degree of rationality of the experiment participants,
which then rather than observed action are compared. Unlike the UG experiment, the quan-
tal response equilibrium model of social preferences can be used to forecast behavior in other
contexts than the UG after its parameters are estimated.
4 Model
Positive average offers and rejection of small proposals in the UG resemble typical experimen-
tal behavior that has been studied extensively. This behavioral pattern is predicted, for instance,
by models, which assume that players care about fairness in addition to self-interest (Bolton &
Ockenfels 2000; Fehr & Schmidt 1999). Suchlike models of social preferences trigger positive
offers in the UG through inequality averse enough responders R, who reject small offers. Inde-
pendently of triggered positive offers, non-zero offers will also be made by proposers P who
are themselves substantially inequality averse.
Adopting the functional representation of concern for fairness proposed by Bolton & Ock-
enfels (2000), I estimate the coefficient of a quadratic loss function by which deviations from
payoff equity diminish the utility gained from the own payoff:
ui(xi, x−i) =
{
c
(
ωi − b2
(
ωi − 12
)2)
if xi, x−i 6= 0
0 if xi, x−i = 0
Surplus c = xi + x−i is the sum of individual payoffs and ωi = xic is the proportion of the
surplus player i ∈ {P, R} gets. Parameter b measures the importance of relative gains in
comparison to own monetary payoff. It is interpreted as fairness and assumed common to
a population. For b > 0, ceteris paribus, utility decreases if there is an inequality in payoffs
regardless whether it is to a player’s advantage or disadvantage. This effect is the stronger
the larger an inequality. In the UG, such utility implies that the responder rejects unequal pro-
posals if b > 2ωR (ωR − 0.5)−2. The proposer, intrinsically or together with anticipation of a
fair-minded responder’s rejection of small or large offers, may offer higher amounts than im-
plied by pure self-interest. As the degree of fairness b co-determines behavior in the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the UG, variations therein give a rationale for the varying degree of shar-
ing behavior observed between resettled and traditional villagers in the Zimbabwean UG field
experiment.
To capture variation in the optimal play of individuals who share one and the same prefer-
ences, an anticipated random shock shall add to the expected utility and cause players to not
always choose their best strategy given their beliefs. Each player knows that the other player
does so as well and anticipates the preferences and decision error of other. As a consequence,
all strategies of a player can be observed with some probability. For a given error structure the
equilibrium is defined as a fixed point of this process with mutual correct anticipation. McK-
elvey & Palfrey (1995) and Mckelvey & Palfrey (1998) established the existence of this quantal
response equilibrium (QRE) under the assumptions that players maximize utility and estimate
expected payoffs in an unbiased way.4
4The original QRE is based on a game’s normal-form, which disregards that, in the UG, the responder can
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In the UG played in the Zimbabwean villages, the proposer P chooses a strategy s ∈ SP
in his discrete strategy set SP = {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1} of eleven possible offers, in which the stakes
of Zim$ 50 are normalized to one. The portion s denotes how much the proposer offers to the
responder R and (1− s) is what he would like to keep for himself. The behavioral strategy
r (s) ∈ SR of the responder is a function that maps each possible offer into his dichotomous
strategy set SR = {Accept, Reject}. Assuming the best response functions follow a logit distri-
bution, the resulting QRE is often called a logit equilibrium, in which players’ optimal mixed
strategies are determined by the pair of probabilities that solve:
pR (s) =
exp(λu(s,1−s))
1+exp(λu(s,1−s)) and pP (s) =
exp(λpR(s)u(1−s,s))
∑s˜∈SP exp(λpR(s˜)u(1−s˜,s˜))
The numerators are exponential functions of the expected payoffs that result from the UG be-
havior. The denominators are normalizing factors that force the probabilities to sum to one.5
The distribution parameter λ is a common measure of rationality, which implies that each strat-
egy is chosen with equal probability if λ→ 0 and that the expected utility maximizing strategy
is chosen with certainty if λ → ∞. The logit response functions pP (s) and pR (s) also define
the logit equilibrium for the UG. They imply that strategies with higher expected payoffs are
chosen with higher probability. The logit equilibrium approaches a subset of Nash equilibria
as rationality increases, i.e. decision errors decrease (McKelvey & Palfrey 1995; Yi 2005). As the
random utility shocks in the model cause different experienced utility at identical behavior, one
interpretation of the QRE framework is that it represents heterogeneity between individuals,
which is not covered by the preference parameter b.
5 Estimation
The stochastic equilibrium prediction of the logit equilibrium, in contrast to the deterministic
Nash equilibrium, allows to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the strength of fairness
b relative to self-interest and the degree of rationality λ. As the joint density of k ∈ {1, ..., K}
independent and identically distributed observations is given by multiplying the probabilities
to observe each individual outcome, the log-likelihood of observing a particular sample of k
observations in the UG is given by:
ln L (λ) =∑
k
dk ln [pP (s) · pR (s)] +∑
k
(1− dk) ln [pP (s) · (1− pR (s))]
Dummy dk assumes unity for acceptance and naught for rejection of s. The identification of
parameters b and λ in the likelihood function is warranted through the functional form of the
employed utility function. The degree of rationality λ is affected proportionally and inequality
aversion b disproportionately high by payoff variations.
make his choice between accepting and rejecting, given the offer. McKelvey and Palfrey later extended the QRE to
extensive-form games, proposing an agent QRE. The agent QRE is defined similar to the normal-form QRE, but for
the agent normal-form of an extensive-form game, in which different information sets of a given player are assumed
to be played independently by different agents, who share the same payoff function. This paper applies the agent
QRE.
5As surplus c and the degree of rationality λ are interchangeable in the logit response functions pR (s) and pP (s),
the size of surplus affects the estimated degree of rationality. All reported estimates for λ are based on c = Zim$ 50.
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5.1 Model fit
Figure 1 shows the observed and predicted play in resettled and traditional villages, overall
and for each sample area. All curves of the predicted behavior (solid lines) show that the model
resembles the observed high frequency (dashed lines) of mid-range offers along with higher re-
jection rates of low offers for the resettled villagers and universal decline in rejection rates for
offers smaller than half. Higher degrees of rationality are reflected by a smaller spread of the
offer distribution. Pronounced interest in fairness causes an incline in the forecast rejection rate
for offers smaller or larger than half, but offers larger than 60 percent are not observed. Table 2a
presents the distribution of observed and predicted offers by area and resettlement status. Cor-
responding table 2b summarizes the actual and forecast rejection rates. The estimated model
correctly predicts the unique mode of equal division in the UG in all areas but Mupfurudzi and
substantial low offer rejection. For all data, the forecast and actual proposer behavior result in
weighted correlation coefficients of 0.73 (resettled) and 0.78 (traditional); the forecast and actual
responder behavior result in correlation coefficients of 0.91 (resettled) and 0.64 (traditional).
Comparing the decisions of proposers and responders in Mupfurudzi, Mutanda and Sen-
gezi with predicted behavior generally also indicates a good fit of the model estimated by area.
The forecast and actual responder behavior result in significant correlation coefficients of 0.65
to 1 in all areas but Sengezi. For traditional Sengezi responders the model over-predicts the
low offer rejection probability of the two rejected lowest offers and fails to capture its peak of
33 percent rejections at offers of 40 percent, leading to a insignificant negative correlation of
-0.24 between observation and prediction.6 A common model is reported for all villagers in the
Mupfurudzi area and will later not be rejected by the data.
5.2 Parameter estimates
In the quantal response equilibrium of the sequential UG, the model is fitted to the data as-
suming the villagers’ choices were mutual best responses, given the own and anticipating the
other’s preferences and degree of rationality. The estimated degree of fairness measures the
extent to which observed offers and rejections are explained by fairness felt toward others tak-
ing into account the occurrence of decision error and rejection of low offers. Based on having
assumed an appropriate model structure, the estimated model parameters therefore reflect the
extent to which rejections were made because of a violation of an intrinsic fairness norm or be-
cause of decision errors. The estimated decision error is part of the model and does not reflect
the model fit of the data.
Table 3 summarizes the parameter estimates of the model by resettlement status. The full
sample consists of 117 pairs of observations. The estimation results are first presented for the
full sample (rows A and B) and then by area (rows C and D). The table also reports the es-
6A single rejection of the two lowest offers instead of certain acceptance in the traditional Sengezi communities
would result in a significant positive correlation between actual and forecast behavior. If the negative correlation
was true, it could point to a failure in the model’s structure. For instance, the model that imposes one and the same
preferences on proposers and responders may not represent the decision-making of responders in Sengezi. Due to
the few available observations this assumption is not tested, but I argue for its plausibility because villagers were
assigned to a role in the UG randomly. If the UG itself does not affect the inert preferences, then there is no reason
to expect systematic differences between proposers and responders. As the model fits the other data well, imposing
the same preference structure for proposers and responders in Sengezi can be a safeguard against data mining in
the small samples.
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timation results for the unrestricted model b,λ|r, t, in which fairness b and rationality λ may
vary across resettlement status; the restricted model λ|r, t, in which solely rationality may vary
across resettlement status; the restricted model b|r, t, in which solely fairness may vary across
resettlement status. A restricted model (not reported), in which rationality may vary across
resettlement status, whereas pure self-interest is assumed, is universally rejected in favor of a
reported model by likelihood-ratio tests. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 repeti-
tions. The corresponding p-values (not reported) indicate that the estimates of each model, but
two traditional Sengezi specifications, are significant at the 1 percent level, confirming the pre-
sumption that decision errors and fairness are both necessary to explain the variation in play
well. No interest in fairness for traditional Sengezi villagers can be rejected at the 15 and 20
percent significance level, respectively (panels D1 and D3).
Panel A1 shows that, overall, positive degrees of fairness and rationality are estimated.
Splitting the sample according to resettlement status (panel B1), I find a significantly higher
degree of fairness in resettled than in traditional villages (13.97 vs. 4.39). At the same time
the degree of rationality is of similar magnitude (6.83 vs. 5.74) without significant difference
such that, overall, a model of different fairness (14.04 vs. 3.80), but similar rationality (6.55) is
accepted by the data (panel A3). Table 4 reports the corresponding likelihood ratio tests that
reject the equality of both coefficients between resettled and traditional villagers, jointly and
individually (tests 1-3, p ≤ 0.04), but not an equal degree of rationality after different degrees
of fairness were estimated (test 5, p = 0.30). In contrast, an equal degree of fairness is rejected
after different degrees of rationality were estimated (test 4, p = 0.01).
Repeating this assessment for each of the three sampled resettlement schemes of Mupfu-
rudzi, Mutanda and Sengezi, I do not detect statistical evidence for different fairness or ratio-
nality between resettled and traditional Mupfurudzi villagers (tests 6-10, p ≥ 0.80). Equality of
both coefficients between resettled and traditional villagers, jointly and individually, is rejected
in the Mutanda and Sengezi areas (tests 11-13 and 15-18, p ≤ 0.02).7 For the Sengezi area, fur-
ther likelihood ratio tests reject that variation in a single parameter is sufficient to explain the
observed differences (tests 19-20, p ≤ 0.04). For the Mutanda area, I reject only various degrees
of fairness (test 15, p = 0.02). I also tentatively reject only differences in the villagers’ degree of
rationality with an 11 percent probability of error (test 14, p = 0.11). As the Mutanda area is the
smallest subsample in the analyses with only 19 pairs of observations, the applied likelihood
ratio test could lack power to depict the relatively large difference in estimated fairness (25.09
vs. 6.39) as significant.8
In the Mutanda and Sengezi resettlement schemes, the higher degree of fairness occurs
jointly with a higher degree of rationality. This finding supports the idea that resettled vil-
lagers not only had a raised need of cooperativeness after their recommencement but also
gained experience in cooperating in the past, which in turn is facilitated by their fairness pref-
erences. When the model is estimated with all data, the data of villagers from three different
resettlement schemes are pooled. The resulting estimates indicate a higher degree of fairness
7Detecting different preferences in Mutanda, for which descriptive statistics did not indicate behavioral differ-
ences, provides a salient example of the different level of analysis that is imposed by the structural equilibrium
model as compared to non-equilibrium analyses of the UG data.
8The nine pairs of resettled Mutanda villagers’ play resulted in only two outcomes involving seven equal parti-
tions and two 40 percent offers, all of which were accepted. The low little degree of bounded rationality needed to
explain these deviations causes their degree of rationality to take the highest values in the sample. For the restricted
model of unique fairness, the rationality estimate λ equals its upper bound 100.
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for resettled villagers, but a similar degree of rationality for all villagers. That is consistent
with the intuition that heterogeneity between individuals, which is not covered by the prefer-
ence parameter b, converges in a larger sample, whereas the increased need for cooperation in
recommencement remains an experience shared only by resettled villagers.
5.3 Limitations
The discussed findings are subject to limitations. Preferences were not estimated on the in-
dividual, but on the area and resettlement status level. Decision error is the way the model
accounts for heterogeneity between individuals. The assumed structural form of the model
was only tested against one alternative, an asymmetric specification of inequality aversion by
(Kohler 2008). The model remains motivated by its success to predict this and other behavioral
data. The analyses is based on a small data sample from an UG experiment in the field with 117
pairs of observations and little variation in the observed behavior. 65 percent of the proposing
players offer half, 92 percent of the responding players accept. These limiting factors are exac-
erbated within the three regional subgroup analyses of the impact of resettlement on the pref-
erences. In spite of these limitations, a coherent picture emerged: Average fairness is estimated
higher for resettled than for traditional villages in each area. The difference is significant in
Sengezi and arguably Mutanda, but insignificant in the Mupfurudzi area. Significantly higher
fairness estimates are accompanied by significantly lower decision errors, potentially reflecting
more experience amongst the resettled villagers with cooperation. Comparing resettled and
traditional villagers across all three study areas, fairness remains the sole significant difference
in the model estimates, which is consistent with the intuition that variations in the observed
ultimatum game play, but not the history dependent attitudes toward fairness converge in the
larger sample with data from all areas.
6 Conclusion
I reexamined preexisting experimental data from ultimatum games conducted in the aftermath
of the Zimbabwean 1980s willing-buyer and willing-seller land reform. A structural model at-
tributed observed ultimatum game behavior to its potential origins. Based on the experimental
behavior of 234 resettled and traditional villagers, I estimated social preferences on the com-
munity level that incorporate a utility loss when bargaining villagers obtain other than a fair
division of the money at stake in the game. The strength of the utility loss in comparison to
self-interest was interpreted as concern for fairness, the assumed proxy for social cohesion.
The quantal response equilibrium model used to estimate villagers’ average concern for fair-
ness introduced a notion of bounded rationality that assumes players make similar decision
errors, which are negatively related to the payoff from that decision. Decision error could be
interpreted as an estimate of heterogeneity in fairness between individuals. In the equilibrium,
the players were assumed to maximize utility and correctly anticipate subsequent behavior.
The estimates of fairness and decision error were obtained by maximizing the likelihood of
observing the experimental behavior.
Significantly positive degrees of fairness and bounded rationality forecast bargaining be-
havior accurately for most participants of the experiments in resettled and traditional villages
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of the Mupfurudzi, Mutanda and Sengezi areas with correlations of 0.45 to 1 between all ob-
served and predicted behavior. The homogeneity of resettled and traditional villagers is re-
jected in favor of a model that assumes higher average degrees of fairness and rationality in
the resettled communities of Mutanda and Sengezi. Higher fairness and rationality are also
estimated for resettled villagers in the Mupfurudzi area, but the differences in the estimates
of resettled and traditional villagers are insignificant. The fewer decision errors made by re-
settled villagers may reflect an increased experience in cooperating with a randomly matched
co-villager acquired in the past, which in turn is promoted by the more pronounced fairness
preferences. In a supraregional estimation of the model, the aggregate data do not reject the hy-
pothesis that the observed differences in bargaining behavior are explained alone by a higher
degree of fairness in resettled communities.
The equal or higher degrees of fairness estimated from ultimatum game behavior for reset-
tled villagers represent a stronger interdependence of their well-being and, thus, indicate that
social cohesion amongst randomly teamed villagers might be present in the new communities
to a comparable or higher degree than in traditional communities. A higher degree of inter-
est in equal performance is less likely to be overruled by self-interest. Hence, it gives cause
for more stable cooperation, for instance, in public goods provision arguably much needed to
successfully manage a new start. As the land reform scheme, by which the resettled villages
were created, brought together people displaced by the fighting after the end of the war of in-
dependence, who were unrelated individuals sometimes not sharing a common ethnicity and
language, but faced a comparable livelihood to the traditional villagers until resettlement, the
depicted differences in villagers preferences along the dimension of the land reform not only
surprise, but might, to some extend, result from the need to cooperate with unfamiliar people
after the resettlement process. This positive view on social development after resettlement is
against the backdrop that, according to Kinsey (2004), the early years were a Golden Age for
the Zimbabwean land reform program, in which beneficiaries received exceptional levels of
supporting services.
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Table 1: Summary of ultimatum game bargaining experiment
N MN SD N MN SD N MN SD N MN SD
Offer 117 0,44 0,11 a 64 0,44 0,12 19 0,45 0,10 34 0,44 0,11 b
Rejection 117 0,08 0,27 64 0,09 0,29 19 0,05 0,23 34 0,06 0,24
… if offer < 0.5 38 0,24 0,43 c 21 0,29 0,46 5 0,20 0,45 12 0,17 0,39
… if offer < 0.3 13 0,46 0,52 d 8 0,50 0,54 2 0,50 0,71 3 0,33 0,58 e
Offer 86 0,45 0,10 52 0,45 0,12 9 0,48 0,04 25 0,46 0,08
Rejection 86 0,07 0,26 52 0,10 0,30 9 0,00 0,00 25 0,04 0,20
… if offer < 0.5 24 0,25 0,44 15 0,33 0,49 2 0,00 0,00 7 0,14 0,38
… if offer < 0.3 7 0,57 0,54 6 0,50 0,55 0 1 1,00
Offer 31 0,41 0,14 12 0,41 0,13 10 0,43 0,13 9 0,38 0,17
Rejection 31 0,10 0,30 12 0,08 0,29 10 0,10 0,32 9 0,11 0,33
… if offer < 0.5 14 0,21 0,43 6 0,17 0,41 3 0,33 0,58 5 0,20 0,45
… if offer < 0.3 6 0,33 0,52 2 0,50 0,71 2 0,50 0,71 2 0,00 0,00
MutandaActionArea
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
R
es
et
tle
d
A
ll
All MupfurudziSengezi
Notes: Tests refer to differences by resettlement status: at-test and Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test for
equality of means, 5 percent. bt-test for equality of means, 10 percent. cChi-square test for equality of
rejected proportions, 10 percent. dFisher’s exact test for equality of rejected proportions, 10 percent.
eFisher’s exact test for equality of rejected proportions, 16 percent. Data source: Barr (2004b).
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Table 2a: Observed and predicted offer distribution
N Actual Model N Actual Model N Actual Model N Actual Model N Actual Model N Actual Model N Actual Model
0 0 0,00 0,01 1 0,03 0,01 0 0,00 0,02 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,01 1 0,11 0,01
0,1 2 0,02 0,01 1 0,03 0,01 3 0,05 0,02 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,01 0 0,00 0,01
0,2 5 0,06 0,01 4 0,13 0,01 5 0,08 0,03 0 0,00 0,00 2 0,20 0,00 1 0,04 0,01 1 0,11 0,01
0,3 3 0,03 0,06 0 0,00 0,06 2 0,03 0,12 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 1 0,04 0,01 0 0,00 0,01
0,4 14 0,16 0,36 8 0,26 0,36 11 0,17 0,33 2 0,22 0,22 1 0,10 0,22 5 0,20 0,30 3 0,33 0,30
0,5 59 0,69 0,37 17 0,55 0,37 40 0,63 0,31 7 0,78 0,78 7 0,70 0,78 18 0,72 0,58 4 0,44 0,58
0,6 3 0,03 0,12 0 0,00 0,12 3 0,05 0,13 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,07 0 0,00 0,07
0,7 0 0,00 0,02 0 0,00 0,02 0 0,00 0,03 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00
0,8 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,01 0 0,00 0,01
0,9 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,01 0 0,00 0,01
1 0 0,00 0,01 0 0,00 0,01 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,00 0 0,00 0,01 0 0,00 0,01
CorrelationP 0,73 *** 0,78 *** 0,68 *** 1,00 *** 0,96 *** 0,97 *** 0,98 ***
CorrelationPR 0,73 *** 0,69 *** 0,65 *** 1,00 *** 0,97 *** 0,89 *** 0,45 *
Offer
All Mupfurudzi Mutanda Sengezi
b,λ | r,t b,λ b,λ | r,t b,λ | r,t
Resettled Traditional All Resettled Traditional Resettled Traditional
Notes: |r, t denotes estimates that depend on resettlement status. R, PRCorrelation between observed and predicted rejections or offers plus
rejections, respectively. Stars denote significance at the 10 and 1 percent level. Data source: Barr (2004b).
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Table 2b: Observed and predicted rejection rates
N Actual Model N Actual Model N Actual Model N Actual Model N Actual Model N Actual Model N Actual Model
0 0 1,00 1 0,00 0,96 0 1,00 0 1,00 0 0,99 0 1,00 1 0,00 0,74
0,1 2 0,50 1,00 1 1,00 0,81 3 0,67 0,99 0 1,00 0 0,92 0 1,00 0 0,55
0,2 5 0,60 0,95 4 0,25 0,50 5 0,40 0,82 0 1,00 2 0,50 0,63 1 1,00 1,00 1 0,00 0,36
0,3 3 0,00 0,47 0 0,23 2 0,00 0,36 0 1,00 0 0,26 1 0,00 0,91 0 0,21
0,4 14 0,14 0,09 8 0,13 0,10 11 0,18 0,11 2 0,00 0,00 1 0,00 0,10 5 0,00 0,09 3 0,33 0,13
0,5 59 0,00 0,03 17 0,00 0,05 40 0,00 0,05 7 0,00 0,00 7 0,00 0,05 18 0,00 0,01 4 0,00 0,08
0,6 3 0,00 0,03 0 0,03 3 0,00 0,04 0 0,00 0 0,03 0 0,02 0 0,05
0,7 0 0,05 0 0,03 0 0,05 0 0,00 0 0,03 0 0,22 0 0,04
0,8 0 0,24 0 0,03 0 0,11 0 1,00 0 0,05 0 0,98 0 0,03
0,9 0 0,82 0 0,04 0 0,36 0 1,00 0 0,09 0 1,00 0 0,02
1 0 0,99 0 0,07 0 0,82 0 1,00 0 0,23 0 1,00 0 0,02
CorrelationR 0,91 *** 0,64 *** 0,91 *** - 1,00 *** 0,72 *** -0,24
CorrelationPR 0,73 *** 0,69 *** 0,65 *** 1,00 *** 0,97 *** 0,89 *** 0,45 *
Traditional All Resettled Traditional Resettled Traditional
Rejection
of offer
All Mupfurudzi Mutanda Sengezi
b,λ | r,t b,λ b,λ | r,t b,λ | r,t
Resettled
Notes: |r, t denotes estimates that depend on resettlement status. R, PRCorrelation between observed and predicted rejections or offers plus
rejections, respectively. Stars denote significance at the 10 and 1 percent level. Data source: Barr (2004b).
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Table 3: Estimation results of logit equilibrium models
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
A All All 117 9,80 3,76 6,19 0,55 210,07
Yes 86 13,97 6,12 6,83 0,74 139,30 6,81 0,71 140,52 14,04 6,15 139,44
No 31 4,39 6,03 5,74 2,62 64,68 4,86 3,31 67,34 3,80 6,39 65,09
Mup All 64 10,04 5,39 5,96 0,64 118,00
Mut All 19 17,82 16,19 7,15 13,23 28,84
Sen All 34 8,18 8,62 6,35 4,84 61,79
Yes 52 10,21 6,91 5,89 0,71 96,37 5,90 0,73 96,37 10,19 7,02 96,37
No 12 9,30 13,43 6,28 17,91 21,59 6,26 10,81 21,60 9,41 14,67 21,62
Yes 9 25,09 16,73 49,03 15,08 4,77 100,00 40,36 4,79 37,58 22,97 6,47
No 10 6,39 29,71 5,93 16,30 18,86 5,37 24,40 20,10 3,87 29,69 19,69
Yes 25 27,86 11,09 9,02 17,89 28,66 9,07 27,74 29,89 26,77 12,48 29,44
No 9 1,74 11,03 a 4,90 12,10 22,23 1,85 10,33 25,99 1,09 11,92 b 23,62
NResArea
11,33
12,44
5,61
22,19 8,45
14,58
0,566,55
7,40
D
C
B All
4,22
15,20
0,66
Sen
Mut
Mup
–ln L
10,05 5,96
4,1710,38
λ b λ–ln L
321
–ln L
b,λ | r,t λ | r,t b | r,t
b λ b
Notes: N denotes the number of proposer and responder pairs. |r, t denotes estimates that depend on resettlement status. ln L denotes the
log-likelihood of the fitted model. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions. Coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level
unless marked otherwise. a,b Bootstrapped p-value are 0.15 and 0.20, respectively. Data source: Barr (2004b).
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Table 4: Summary of hypotheses and tests
H0 H1 H0 H1 d f. H0 H1
b,λ b,λ | r,t 2 4 2 210,07 203,99 12,16 0,00 *** 1
b,λ λ | r,t 2 3 1 210,07 207,87 4,40 0,04 ** 2
b,λ b | r,t 2 3 1 210,07 204,53 11,07 0,00 *** 3
λ | r,t b,λ | r,t 3 4 1 207,87 203,99 7,76 0,01 *** 4
b | r,t b,λ | r,t 3 4 1 204,53 203,99 1,09 0,30 5
b,λ b,λ | r,t 2 4 2 118,00 117,96 0,09 0,96 6
b,λ λ | r,t 2 3 1 118,00 117,98 0,06 0,81 7
b,λ b | r,t 2 3 1 118,00 117,99 0,02 0,88 8
λ | r,t b,λ | r,t 3 4 1 117,98 117,96 0,03 0,86 9
b | r,t b,λ | r,t 3 4 1 117,99 117,96 0,07 0,80 10
b,λ b,λ | r,t 2 4 2 28,84 23,62 10,43 0,01 *** 11
b,λ λ | r,t 2 3 1 28,84 24,88 7,90 0,00 *** 12
b,λ b | r,t 2 3 1 28,84 26,16 5,36 0,02 ** 13
λ | r,t b,λ | r,t 3 4 1 24,88 23,62 2,52 0,11 + 14
b | r,t b,λ | r,t 3 4 1 26,16 23,62 5,07 0,02 ** 15
b,λ b,λ | r,t 2 4 2 61,79 50,89 21,79 0,00 *** 16
b,λ λ | r,t 2 3 1 61,79 55,87 11,83 0,00 *** 17
b,λ b | r,t 2 3 1 61,79 53,06 17,46 0,00 *** 18
λ | r,t b,λ | r,t 3 4 1 55,87 50,89 9,97 0,00 *** 19
b | r,t b,λ | r,t 3 4 1 53,06 50,89 4,34 0,04 ** 20
Testp-Value
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ll
Area
Se
ng
ez
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ut
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M
up
fu
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dz
i
Hypothesis –ln L LRNo. parameters
Notes: d.f. denotes degrees of freedom. ln L denotes the log-likelihood of the
fitted model. LR denotes the likelihood-ratio test statistic. P-values stem from
a Chi-squared distribution. |r, t denotes estimates that depend on resettlement
status. Stars denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. + denotes
significance at the 11 percent level. Data source: Barr (2004b).
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Figure 1: Observed and predicted offer distribution and rejection rates
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Notes: Dashed lines indicate actual play. Solid lines indicate model prediction. Blue lines and
upward-pointing triangle indicate resettled villages. Red lines and downward-pointing triangle
indicate traditional villages. Data source: Barr (2004b).
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